

The peculiar place of Enlightenment ideals in the governance concept of citizenship and democracy

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This chapter examines a foundational democratic practice by considering how it expresses concepts of the Enlightenment. The practice is that of the vote or plebiscite as it appears in governance. The leading Enlightenment concept is rationality as it is expounded by Kant.

Kant did not participate in national democratic processes. He expected decisions of any consequence to be made in Berlin and thrived when his City was invaded by the Russians and their officers became his students, until they left suddenly in 1762 (Kuehn, 2001, p.126). Kant participated in political debate where the issues were in the main constitutional and about the processes of government reform. He became known for his theory of natural law and the justification of positive law. He advocated the separation of powers, but denied the right of revolution. This latter conclusion was in apparent contradiction of his support for republicanism, including the French, English, and American revolutions (Beck, 1971, p.413). The term “republican” in Kant’s writings is sometimes interpreted to mean “parliamentary democracy”. This is probably a mistake, and Reiss suggests Kant’s term does not carry the “connotation” of modern Western democracy (Reiss’s “Introduction” in Kant, 1991a, p.25). Kant himself wrote that he wanted to prevent “the republican constitution from being confused with the democratic one, as commonly happens” (Kant, 1991a, p.100). So it is that, whilst Kant wrote about the interaction of morality and politics, he did not write on the topic of the present chapter which focuses on those mechanisms or mechanics that democracy displays when it works.

The approach to the topic taken here is:

1. To locate citizenship and democracy as embedded concepts, building upon the insights of Foucault. (The contrast is with territorial concepts of citizenship.)
2. To identify the activity of governance as being the pervasive practical expression of embedded democracy in the West and to sketch the governance concept of citizenship.
3. To identify the vote or plebiscite as a critical human practice of democratic governance and to examine this practice phenomenologically.
4. To draw upon Kant’s views about rationality, and related Enlightenment notions, to provide insight into this human practice.

Citizenship and democracy: embodied practice

It is hardly a surprise that citizenship is the subject of academic books and state funding. Global politics through the 1990s intensified a political re-ordering that affected ordinary people. The breakdown of the Soviet empire, the tortuous moves towards economic and political integration in Western Europe, and George W Bush’s contribution towards global nationalism – all made the individuals relationship to the state an issue. Europe first, and then other places, were caught in the “incongruity of (their) historical processes” (Resina, 2006, p.46).

For ordinary people, particularly those caught up on global events, citizenship is associated with their having a secure place to live. Many think of citizenship in terms of state boundaries, administrations, and rights. That territory is foundational of United States citizenship is supported by the Constitution:

“All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside” (Amendment XIV, Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, 1781).

Those who drafted the European Constitution make territory as important as democratic participation. In the list of citizens’ rights they begin with the right of the individual to move within a territory and follow that with the right to democratic participation (See I-10, 2).

Yet, when prospective American citizens learn in their “catechism” that the most important right of a citizen is the right to vote, they learn a useful truth that does not relate to territorial concepts (Christian Science Monitor, 2006, p.8; Holder & Holder, 1997, p.97). The catechism relates an abstract notion to a practical human action, which, as it turns out, needs to be integral to a way of life. The right to vote may be linked in people’s minds with territory because of contingent circumstances (the place and its administration) but the right to vote itself is, along with citizenship itself, settled in the concept of democracy, and only contingently associated with territory in particular examples. There are examples where migrants new to a democratic country do not adopt democratic practices (for example, they may not vote in national elections although they are entitled to vote, or they may form alternative power structures to the civil authority). Being credentialed as a citizen does not of itself generate a commitment to the core practices required. Some nations attempt to make the core practice compulsory. For example, Australia - being a nation of migrants - has experimented with compulsory voting and in this they recognise the embodied nature of the core practice.

The Western concept of citizenship is an integral part of the notion of democracy. The notion of democracy entails a notion of citizenship. The overwhelming feature of the basket of concepts around the notion of democracy - and indeed all political concepts - is that they are hollow and incomplete thoughts unless considered through situated practice. They are always “embodied” concepts that appear integrally with human beings who collectively seek goals. These concepts constitute themselves within a framework of rules that belong to human beings. The first purpose of the present paper is to set out the correct context for the notion of citizenship when citizenship constitutes in this way.

Above the word “context” appears and this requires a caveat. The word “context” when applied to concepts (such as citizenship) might suggest an opportunity for conceptual analysis or an immediate practical application of a concept in a set of circumstances. Both these suggestions ask us to narrow our field of vision and to confine “citizenship” in an aseptic way. Here, a less rationalistic, and more determinedly historical, use and understanding of the word is appropriate. This must be a use that places concepts in a distinctly human trajectory that is part of the facticity of each of us, and is akin to Foucault’s notion of “apparatus” as system:

“... a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions... Such are the elements of an apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be established between these elements” (Foucault, 1980, p.194).

Human beings find themselves within Foucault’s “apparatus”. Berlin called it a jigsaw puzzle: “We lie among the disjected fragments of this puzzle” (Berlin, 1999, p.23). Pertinent to the present chapter is Foucault’s decision to call this apparently inert, structural complexity in which we passively rest, “governmentality” meaning “governmental rationality” (Gordon, 1991, p.1). It is the Enlightenment thinkers who will assist us to understand why Foucault emphasizes “rationality”.

Foucault’s leading concept is the generic notion of “the problem of government” and in particular it’s new expression in the sixteenth century when the “shattering of feudalism” lead to the establishment of “great territorial, administrative and colonial states” (Foucault, 1991, pp.87-88). The present paper confines itself to the Western democratic species of territorial administrations. From the point-of-view of citizenship, Foucault moves us from the serf or subject to territorial citizens, and the present paper discusses a move beyond the “territorial concept of citizenship”.

Several writers attempt to construct post-national concepts of citizenship that eliminate territory from the idea. They are often mistaken in their first premise, namely, that territory was ever essentially in the idea (recent discussions of relevant concepts may be found in Dobrowolsky & Jenson, 2004; Sassen, 2003).

Some writers highlight one aspect of the citizenship concept without taking a doggedly phenomenological stance. A recent example is a description for Botswana where citizenship is rendered “as a feature of active, participatory democracy” (Preece & Mosweunyane, 2004, p.5). Peters has emphasized identity concepts of citizenship and how they can participate in arguments for global citizenship in a post-9/11 world (M. Peters, 2004). The alleged evil of cultural assimilation often lurks within the identity concept of citizenship, and educators can suffer some of the criticism that thereby ensues:

“Western-bound curricula have continually produced graduates who are alienated and disenfranchised from their own people” (Ndura, 2006, p.95).

Finally with regard to the contrasts to the approach of the present chapter, it might be thought that those who emphasize “ontology or a statement of what seem to be the most salient features of our world at a particular time” and write that “perspectives derive from a position in space and time, specifically social and political space and time” would focus on extant practices. However, Hewson and Sinclair list the salient features of global governance theory as being epistemic authority, marketized institutions, and the complex of infrastructural technologies associated with the emerging knowledge economy (Hewson & Sinclair, 1999, p.17). The Husserlian dictum “to the things themselves” did not impress these authors.

The governance concept of citizenship/democracy

If we are to understand citizenship as an embodied practice it is necessary to attend to phenomena that reveal “citizenship” at work. Learning the new residents’ catechism and the study of maps are related to citizenship, but they are hardly vital. Nor is the

enjoyment of a wide range of rights – benefits and protections - that accrue to citizens and vary from administration to administration.

In the West's ideological and inherently technological practice there are today two legitimate ways by which individuals assert themselves. These are through financial resources and through the processes of democratic decision-making. Western processes often display as a tussle between money and votes – commerce and politics. Citizenship as a practice and a concept appears in the altercation about votes.

The word now used in Western management theory to describe processes with an element of democratic practice is “governance”. The older colonial notions of an “appointed governor” or “superior” fade as democracy endures. The terms “the governance concept of citizenship” or “the governance concept of democracy” are appropriate to describe certain ideas that are situated in the apparatus.

To explore this further, it is necessary to narrow the focus of the investigation and examine human practices that intimately entail the concepts. This narrowing is presented below in two steps:

1. At the level of the “apparatus”, artifacts are considered.
2. At the level of the “form of life” a core practice is identified from the artifacts and a brief phenomenological account is given of that practice.

Two examples will demonstrate the home of “citizenship” and the relationships set out above, one drawn from government and one from outside of government. The government example could be any statute anywhere. However, because it illustrates points that are useful elsewhere in the present book, the example is a statute about citizenship.

Germany's Reichstag enacted the *Nuremberg Laws on Reich Citizenship* on September 15, 1935. Their notice of promulgation - that is now an artifact for our investigation - cited the Law and reads (in translation):

“Article 1

1. A subject of the State is a person who enjoys the protection of the German Reich and who in consequence has specific obligations towards it.
2. The status of subject of the State is acquired in accordance with the provisions of the Reich and State Citizenship Law.

Article 2

1. A Reich citizen is a subject of the State who is of German or related blood, who proves by his conduct that he is willing and fit faithfully to serve the German people and Reich.
2. Reich citizenship is acquired by the granting of Reich Citizenship Certificate.
3. The Reich citizen is the sole bearer of full political rights in accordance with the Law.

Article 3

The Reich Minister of the Interior, in coordination with the Deputy of the Führer, will issue the Legal and Administrative orders required to implement and complete this Law” (Arad, Gutman, & Margalot, 1999, p.77).

This statute reveals a practical, human system that depends on, and is constituted by, human needs and facticity. The concepts are a small part within the practical system, and the practical system is a part of Foucault's “apparatus”.

The foundational structures assumed or established – revealed - by this statute are:

1. Constitution of a governance body. There is an already constituted authority present, the Reichstag that unanimously enacted the statute.
2. Context of governance. The governors operate within a context of governance (they hold power and office on the day, they establish laws, are taken seriously, and have an historical presence).
3. Management structure. The governance body has at its disposal a management structure or operational executive or civil service. This gives the authority the means to implement its decisions.
4. Citizens. Several groups of people are always necessary in a statute, and in this particular statute some are defined. There are those who are subjects of the State. Then, there are the citizens. In this case they are subjects of the State who satisfy further criteria. In all the statutes of a democracy there is the group of citizens who contribute to the establishment of the governors.
5. A mechanism to gain inclusion in the group of citizens is specified (Article 1.2; Article 2.2).
6. Management made responsible. Those charged with the implementation (executive) acquire duties and responsibilities as a result of the governors' decision. These are the Reich Minister of the Interior and the Deputy of the Führer immediately, and then others as they "order". The Minister holds a duty to issue Reich Citizenship Certificate's in accordance with the Law.
7. Those with citizenship rights gain benefits (Article 2.3). They are the "sole bearer" of "full political rights". They also gain the "protection of the German Reich", along with others who are "subjects of the State" (Article 1.1).

The same complex and extended circumstances that enable government, Foucault's "apparatus", enable the operation of publicly listed Western companies. Briefly, the package is:

1. The constitution of a governance body.
2. A context of governance. Imposed provisions such as the law of the country moderate what can be done, and the board makes decisions within this framework and other rules the owners may have established.
3. A management structure, to implements the decisions of the board.
4. The accumulation of "citizens" that are now called "owners", or "stock holders".
5. A mechanism to gain inclusion in the group (often the purchasing of stocks or the formation of a business).
6. A mechanism to make management responsible (an accountability framework). Normally, the chief executive officer and others are directly responsible to the board and there are audit provisions.
7. Those with stockholder rights gain benefits that are primarily the right to vote for members of the governance body and to share in the profits. Other rights are possible.

These structures themselves are not greatly contentious within Western countries. Perhaps the greatest challenge to them comes from indigenous people who wish to use traditional decision-making practices as an alternative to democratic processes. They express this in relation to both national governance and the governance of businesses.

Examples come from Polynesian people in various Pacific countries (Schmidtke, 2002; Taurima & Cash, 2000).

It is apparent that there is a type of neutrality about the underlying structural framework (or form) just described, and this is consistent with the Foucault-Berlin account of the apparatus as a whole. However, to understand the success of democracy, two features of this governance structure need to be made apparent:

1. The structure itself provides opportunities for argument over issues.
2. This structure holds within itself an imperative.

When there is an issue to be decided, the structure itself provides opportunities for argument at every node. In the example above, we might say that this particular Reichstag was improperly constituted (with reference to 1 above). It had no legitimate power and should be ignored (2). Civil servants who obeyed the law acted wrongly, indeed some were subsequently convicted (3). The definition of citizens based on race is wrong (4), and so on. The arguments are essentially ethical (in the neutral sense) arguments.

The second step in the argument of this paper regarding the embodied concept of citizenship is to seek from the artifacts the core human engagements that pertain to the apparatus. Where in the governance structures, as displayed in their artifacts, are we to find the preminent and indispensable human practice?

The observation needed to make the second step is very basic – the whole democratic system is about decision-making. Foucault sees this when he says that government is not about “imposing law on men” but about “disposing things”, which is to “arrange things in such a way that , through a certain number of means such ends may be achieved” (Foucault, 1991, p.95).

O’Loughlin assists in this search, which is for the time and place of the birth process for the statutes that assign things:

“Place ... is really about *where there is something meaningful going on*. Its patterns arise not from detailed conscious planning but from the pre-reflective interaction of individuals who usually remain unaware off the totality they have assisted in creating through their embodied actions” (O’Loughlin, 2006, p.86).

The system or apparatus that is itself embodied is the embodiment for a form of human expression that is collective decision-making. Human beings make decisions and one identifiable approach is that of democracy. The human phenomenon most distinctive of this is the vote or plebiscite. It is a phenomenon that is indispensable to democracy in any form. The place of democracy is where two more of us record our position on a question. This recording is always within a structural framework that is itself the framework of democracy.

There are two situations to consider, the first is the plebiscite to establish the governors, and the second is the decision-making of the governors once they hold office and which is best called “voting”.

The vital phenomenological insight is that those who participate in plebiscite or vote do so in a mechanical way. The action is to mark a piece of paper, push a button, say “aye”, or raise a hand. The reasons held, or indeed anything mental at all, is irrelevant.

Western democratic governance has one spectacular imperative: to obtain a decision in every case. In this it reveals itself as a technology inherent in the apparatus when the word “apparatus” is used to include the system of relations that embraces discourses, institutions, and administrations. It is useful to here apply Heidegger’s insights regarding the nature of technology (Heidegger, 1977). What is at stake here is not the quality of the decision but the likelihood of there being an outcome. The technology of the vote overcomes this narrow but vital problem of decision because it pre-configures. Any question that is put to the vote is already entrenched in a Foucault-Berlin world. The question gains support from many places, events, commitments, beliefs, compromises, necessities. Each question is on an historical trajectory. The result is two fold.

1. It is much more likely that there will be a decision; because the whole structure (the forum) is unlikely to collapse. This does not mean that it cannot collapse of course, but in such situations the question at issue changes to be about democracy itself. The proponents of democracy gather around and slowly democracy re-asserts itself. Fiji demonstrates the practice at the moment as it cycles in and out of democracy.
2. The outcome holds a legitimacy that reflects the origin of not just the individual, particular question but of the operative apparatus and the embodiment of the operative apparatus. It may be seen in this that the humble question for decision is beyond the hands of the people who are there to vote on it.

To look at this starkly, each vote a governance body takes is actually the second vote on the matter – the first vote was that which put the governors in place and the second was about the substantive matter. In democratic politics every substantive issue is associated with the possibility of replacing the decision-makers. Less starkly, there is a plethora of decisions already taken that are pertinent to any particular new decision.

Acknowledging a debt to Heidegger (for example, 1977), it is possible to advance two further insights about this:

1. What is being described is an expression of current Western metaphysics which means it is essentially technological.
2. The technological system (governance including its leading practice of voting) operates with its own imperatives and whilst it involves human beings in a multitude of ways, it has a form of independence from any particular human being. Something of how this occurs has already been mentioned when the entailment of voting was considered. More of it lurks, as shall be developed shortly, behind Kant’s belief in a progressive “universal history” of humankind (Kuehn, 2001, p.281).

Incidentally, there is congruence between the phenomenological description of democracy and culture. O’Loughlin takes this right through to a position on the notion of territory that is relevant to the debate on what might be foundational about the phenomenon of democracy. She argues in relation to concepts of culture, that the antithesis of embodiment is territory:

“The culture that shapes and characterises a place is a shared culture – shared by virtue of our shared embodiment, including our technologies. So the view that a culture is some sort of overarching entity, larger and more significant than the individual and superimposed upon a particular defined and bounded ‘territory’, is inaccurate” (O’Loughlin, 2006, p.87).

The example of the vote is one example within the larger framework of culture. What is going on in the spaces where votes are being cast is democracy.

Governance and the Enlightenment

The Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries admits of many interpretations. This chapter particularly draws upon Kant’s insights and considers their expression in the practice of voting. Others have also reflected on the relationship between Enlightenment concepts and democracy - and drawn pessimistic conclusions.

In the intensity of the Second World War, people feared for the loss of their known way of life. Some reflected on which ideas would be lost if the Western ideal was destroyed. Horkheimer and Adorno asked why it was that democratic nations had come to this unexpected end. They concluded that the Enlightenment ideals that underpinned democracy held within themselves the seeds of their own destruction (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1973, p.xiii). They feared they would witness the end of social freedom globally and argued that this was the collapse of Enlightenment ideals. The concepts of the Enlightenment beat a retreat when confronted by Herr Hitler.

The concepts were fundamental, foundational to a lived way of life and that was at stake. The Enlightenment expresses the “actual movement of civil society as a whole in the aspect of its idea as embodied in individuals and institutions”, and accordingly it is a parallel situation to the formation of truth in lived lives (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1973, p.xiv). Only in action and in constantly evolving thought is it possible to grasp the Enlightenment’s fundamental intellectual forces (Cassirer, 1951, p.ix).

These authors bring to the fore the embodied nature of Enlightenment concepts, but what are Cassirer’s “fundamental intellectual forces” and what are the pertinent concepts themselves? Berlin takes us some distance toward the forces when he sets out three foundational propositions, and says they are no more than broad ideas that gain expression in a host of uneven ways. His first proposition is the belief that all genuine questions can be answered by human beings even if it is not immediately apparent what the answer is to a particular question. This is, he claims, a proposition that is common to Christianity, the scholastics, the Enlightenment and the positivist tradition of the twentieth century (Berlin, 1999, pp.21-22). Berlin’s first proposition entails a belief in notion of being enlightened, an allegedly positive state of being.

Yet it is not any form of being enlightened that is adequate. Berlin’s second proposition says that one becomes enlightened when the answers to questions are achieved through the use of a method or technique that is adequate to the task. This method or technique is dependent on the application of human intellect, in short, on rationality:

“That reason possesses the true right of the first-born, and that it is older than any opinion or prejudice which has obscured it in the course of the centuries” (Cassirer, 1951, p.234).

It is in this way that the model of Newtonian science becomes important as a model for the human way of being, and in particular for our purposes, as a model for communal decision-making. Kant found inspirational the clear steps of reasoning that show in Newton's works as well as the utility of Newton's conclusions. Here is a way of being to emulate in the moral and political spheres - the enlightened way of being. The contrast is with the religious way of being, the shaman's way of being, and the way of life of the magician who imitates demons. All these people fall victim to a multiplicity of forces. It is not that they set out to live the form of life they adopt, but rather it just accumulates to them (Adorno, 1973; Horkheimer & Adorno, 1973). Today, we can possibly recognize in human practices and attitudes the scientists' way of being and the religious way of being, whilst the enlightened way of being is more obscure.

It was the enlightened way of being that was constructed by Kant first as a goal for education and then as something desirable for governance. This may be seen in his many essays including *Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment* and *On the Old Saw: 'That May Be Right in Theory but it Won't Work in Practice'* (Kant, 1974; Kant, 1997).

What is distinctive about the "enlightened way of being" as it embraces several disciplines of enquiry? It is the relationship between universals and particulars, which alters when one adheres to the idea of starting with observation. Cassirer calls it the "critical idea by which Newton effected this revolution" (Cassirer, 1981, p.67). Galileo and Newton do not begin, as Cassirer says, with the general concept of "gravity" and then proceed to explain "weight". They work the other way round – from the observations.

Democracy in anything like the modern governance sense was not well understood by Kant. What he lacked was a perspective on how the processes might operate. He did not have available the observations to which he could attend. Accordingly, his approach to the subject is in terms of abstract concepts. Democracy is an example of despotism (the contrast being with republicanism, where the laws are made and executed by different powers). There are two problems with democracy. The first being that:

“... one and the same person cannot at the same time be both the legislator and the executor of his own will, just as the general proposition in logical reasoning cannot at the same time be a secondary proposition subsuming the particular with the general” (Kant, 1991b, p.101).

The second reason is that the alternative despotic forms leave greater opportunity for the "spirit" of this separation that he alludes to in the first reason. Evidently, in this spirit Frederick II said he was merely the "highest servant of the state" (Kant, 1991b, p.101). It may be seen from this that Kant argues about political process by analogy with logic. His intellectual approach to how a complex apparatus might desirably work is limited. Kant does not start, as Newton might recommend, with observations, because there is no adequate practice available for him to observe.

As suggested above, Kant begins and ends with theory. One essay (*What is Orientation in Thinking*) shows how the theoretical use of reason necessarily leads on to the practical use of reason – but this is still within the pages of book (Kant, 1991a,

p.237). We cannot expect from Kant a phenomenological investigation of democracy and must consider his deliberations with that limitation in mind.

The background to Kant's paper on the desirable state of enlightenment is well known (Kuehn, 2001, pp.209-291; Schmidt, 1989). Education's purpose is to take the masses out of tutelage, and this only occurs with the "freedom to make public use of one's reason at every point" (Kant, 1997, p.84). Thus, education and politics are bound together.

It might be thought that this is about individual autonomy, particularly as his examples come from public policy (a person's response to the tax collector is one) but it would be a mistake to associate Kant with the modern notion of autonomy that apparently makes the individual paramount (for example, "Ethics and Education" does this, R. S. Peters, 1970). Peters' discussion of freedom effectively begins with the individual being "on the path to autonomy" (p.192). It is only then the issues of freedom arise, and inevitably they develop locked to the individual.

Kant writes about individual autonomy (make your own decision, do so rationally, and have the strength of will to bring your decision it practice) but that is a small part of a larger conception. Kant's "*realm of ends*" (1997, p.50) has a role in individual autonomy (a connection), but more important, it is contributory to something greater than any individual (the whole of all ends):

"... we can think of a whole of all ends in systematic connection, a whole of rational beings as ends in themselves as well as a whole of particular purposes which each may set for himself" (Kant, 1997, p.50).

The bedrock for Kant's notion of rationality is to be understood in relation to the species (the "large scale"), not the individual. His hope is, as one interpreter says:

"It is also a peculiarity of reason that it cannot be completely realised in the lifetime of an individual, but only in the entire species" ("Introduction" by Reiss, in Kant, 1991c, p.36).

In this perspective on rationality, democracy holds a parallel with Newtonian science. Science does not depend on the contribution of any individual scientist. Rather it is a progressive, communal activity. It is this to which Kant draws our attention when he says of possible methods and technical expressions that science:

... first makes the novice familiar with names the significance and use of which he will only learn in the future" (Kant, 1998, p.627).

Individual persons must enter the method before they can participate as scientists. The errors and the inadequacies of any particular scientist are rectified by others. Most important, however, is that there a structural foundation that maintains itself though the actions of the individual persons. Kant calls this the "art of systems" or "architectonic":

Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and advance its essential ends (Kant, 1998, p.691).

The congruency of scientific practice with its “system” is comparable to the congruency of core democratic practices (most arguably voting) with the political system that we call democracy.

For Kant, the exercise of reason is situated within his “teleological view of Nature” (Kuehn, 2001, p.288). Kant’s conclusions appear consistent with embodiment conceptions of both rationality and governance, although some commentators today may wish to dissociate themselves from Kant’s ideas regarding the inevitability of progress in the history of humanity and the role of God.

“Kant’s view that man’s essence must be realized follows an argument later developed in the *Critique of Judgement* where Kant had maintained that the teleology of nature is internal, not external” (“Introduction” by Reiss in Kant, 1991c, p.36).

“... we must not overlook teleology, which indicates the foresight of a wise agency governing nature” (“First Supplement: On the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace” in Kant, 1991b, p.109).

However, if we set aside Kant’s religious perspective, and focus on the notion that there is an integrated, cohesive, holistic movement at work within human affairs, then Kant’s insight becomes similar to the embodied notion of governmentality:

“Culture was not the result of individual effort, but was produced by mankind as a whole. Man as a rational being therefore needs to live in a historical process. History is a progress towards rationality, but it must not be thought that this process involves a continuous advance in rationality all the time” (“Introduction” by Reiss, in Kant, 1991c, p.36)

“History is concerned with giving an account of these phenomena, no matter how deeply concealed their causes may be, and it allows us to hope that, if it examines the free exercise of the human will *on a large scale*, it will be able to discover a regular progression among freely willed actions” (Kant, 1991b, p.41)

It is helpful to relate Kant to the views of O’Loughlin who considers in her chapter on embodied citizenship the idea that rationality derives from our animal natures and provides a means to participate fruitfully in democracy:

“With regard to citizenship in a democracy, the model of rational deliberation has furnished a means by which citizens may be said to nurture and exercise capacities of reasoning and discussion which otherwise may remain undeveloped. The assumption here is that in the rational community one orients oneself towards the common will, such that the outcome of exhaustive deliberations will eventually generate broad principles applying to all (O’Loughlin, 2006, p.151).

“Rationality is precisely that which builds upon and utilizes our basic animal natures, not something transcending the body and demanding its relegation as a lowly vehicle or instrument” (O’Loughlin, 2006, pp.169-170).

This can suggest, rationality derives from our individually held basic animal characteristics and it is from this capacity that the success of democracy derives as per the “assumption” she identifies. It is through our application of rationality that we “orient” ourselves to the rational community. Our rationality within ourselves then (probably by a leveling process) ensures the decisions of democratic outcomes are rational.

How might Kant's views about rationality relate to the phenomenon of voting as the phenomenological core of democracy? The conclusions are:

1. The structures of society, Foucault's "apparatus", emerge. Kant would say they do so as an expression of humankind's progress as delivered by God. Be that as it may, for human beings there are always "the structures of society" and it is our experience that they alter historically.
2. There will emerge architectonics, systems that are in their unity the form of a whole. Paradigmatic examples are from the modern sciences and mathematics.
3. Each architectonic is held together by a "single supreme and inner end" that makes possible the whole structure. In the present example – democracy - ask what this might be and notice the scope for debate.
4. Rationality expresses itself through these structures or forms. This is Kant's foundational position regarding rationality. It is this that makes him conclude that rationality is a species phenomenon.
5. It is an argument of the present paper that the physical event of voting is the essential practice of democracy, and it is to this event that we must attend if we are to develop a phenomenological account of democracy.
6. Accordingly, citizenship is not the leading concept in democracy. It relates to some particular examples of democracy in practice.
7. When individual persons cast a vote (for the governors, or as a governor), they do so in a manner that is entirely mechanical. This is the phenomenological truth of the vote.
8. Kant will urge individuals who vote to do so in an autonomous way. He would say that they should use the categorical imperative to determine their vote. Even without that universal principle of morality, the form of individual autonomy is highly desirable. That is, the decision maker should make up their own mind (integrity, to some), they should do so rationally, and they should have the strength of will or determination needed to vote as they so decide. Incidentally, this particular conception of moral decision-making was advocated as a base for moral education in British schools with the leading principle to be "concern for other persons" (Wilson, Williams, & Sugarman, 1967).
9. Kant would not expect governors to consistently vote autonomously. How individuals act is far from ideal.
10. Kant's belief in purpose and teleology (and probably the goodness of God) would enable him to be positive about the governance concept of democracy.
11. Without the belief in teleology, it appears that the system of democracy is left without overarching guidance, and people appeal to the notion that collective decisions are more insightful than the decisions of individuals. O'Loughlin identifies this as an "assumption".
12. It is uncertain that democratic systems hold within themselves the ability to adjust when decisions are not optimal. Certainly, the correction of "mistakes" is not an imperative. The contrast is with the system of modern science although it is important to acknowledge that there are debates around the rationality of science and its directions particularly with regard to the role of economics in knowledge creation. Kant's view of science was based on the work of scientists around Newton's time.
13. Kant's teleology would for him explain the observation of voting as a system that is constructed and functions to generate outcomes. Outcomes being

decisions. This alone is the imperative of democracy. The quality of the decisions is less important than that there being decisions.

It is argued in the present paper, that the most peculiar aspect of democracy is that it does not ever depend at its most critical moment – when the vote is taken - on rationality in any sense that refers to individuals. As a structure or form of decision-making, democracy holds within itself its own imperative. The imperative is that there shall be a decision in every case. Each decision shall be within a complex of other decisions, and the complex of other decisions shall be within a frame of governmentality. Governmentality is always within a totally organic, embodied structure where concepts of all kinds play various optional roles.

Finally, the technological nature of such phenomena as the vote was described by Heidegger, whose examples, of mechanized agriculture and the modern commercial aviation industry can disturb us. More disturbing however, could be our appreciation that democracies are not be under human control and that their core decision-making is not rational.

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